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Abstract
This paper examines the roles of bank capital regulation and monetary policy
in mitigating procyclicality and promoting macroeconomic and  nancial stabil-
ity. The analysis is based on a dynamic stochastic model with imperfect credit
markets. Macroeconomic ( nancial) stability is de ned in terms of the volatility
of nominal income (real house prices). Numerical experiments show that even
if monetary policy can react strongly to in ation deviations from target, com-
bining a credit-augmented interest rate rule and a Basel III-type countercyclical
capital regulatory rule may be optimal for promoting overall economic stability.
The greater the degree of interest rate smoothing, and the stronger the policy-
maker’s concern with macroeconomic stability, the larger is the sensitivity of the
regulatory rule to credit growth gaps.
JEL Classi cation Numbers: E44, E51, F41.
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as participants at seminars at the European University Institute and the University of Manchester,
for helpful comments on a previous draft. Financial support from the World Bank is gratefully
acknowledged. A more detailed version of this paper, containing Appendices A, B, and C is available
upon request. The views expressed in this paper are our own.
3Preserving  nancial stability is so closely related to the standard goals of monetary
policy (stabilizing output and in ation) that it... seems somewhere between foolish and
impossible to separate the two functions.
Alan S. Blinder, How Central should the Central Bank Be? (2010, p. 12).
Ensuring  nancial stability requires a redesign of macroeconomic as well as regulatory and
supervisory policies with an eye to mitigating systemic risks. For macroeconomic policies, this
means leaning against credit and asset price booms; for regulatory and supervisory policies,
it means adopting a macroprudential perspective.
Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report 2009 (p. 14).
1 Introduction
The recent crisis in global  nancial markets has led to a substantial number of proposals
aimed at strengthening the  nancial system and at encouraging more prudent lending
behavior in upturns. Many of these proposals aim to mitigate the alleged procyclical
e ects of Basel II capital standards. Indeed, several observers have argued that by
raising capital requirements in a contra-cyclical way, regulators could help to choke o 
asset price bubbles–such as the one that developed in the US housing market–before
a crisis occurs. A recent proposal along these lines, put forward by Goodhart and
Persaud (2008), involves essentially adjusting the Basel II capital requirements to take
i n t oa c c o u n ta n da c ta tt h er e l e v a n tp o i n ti nt h ee c o n o m i cc y c l e . 1 In particular, in
the Goodhart-Persaud proposal, the capital adequacy requirement on mortgage loans
would be linked to the rise in both mortgage lending and house prices.2 The Turner
Review (See Financial Services Authority (2009)) also favors countercyclical capital
requirements, and so do Brunnermeier et al. (2009), who propose to adjust capital
adequacy requirements over the cycle by two multiples–the  rst related to above-
average growth of credit expansion and leverage, the second related to the mismatch
in the maturity of assets and liabilities. Although not as explicit, Blinder (2010) has
also endorsed the view that central banks should try to limit credit-based bubbles
through regulatory instruments (rather than interest rates) and refers to it as possibly
becoming the “new consensus” on how to deal with asset-price bubbles. At the policy
level, there has been concrete progress toward establishing new standards in this area;
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has developed a countercyclical
framework that involves adjusting bank capital in response to excess growth in credit
1Buiter (2008) extended the Goodhart-Persaud proposal by suggesting that capital and liquidity
requirements be applied to all highly leveraged  nancial institutions, not only banks.
2Goodhart and Persaud argue that their proposal could be introduced under the second pillar of
Basel II. While Pillar 1 consists of rules for requiring minimum capital against credit, operational
and market risks, Pillar 2 is supposed to take into account all the additional risks to which a bank
is exposed to, in order to arrive at its actual capital needs. However, by using only Pillar 2 at the
discretion of local regulators it can allow banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage.
4to the private sector, which it views as a good indicator of systemic risk. On November
12, 2010, G20 leaders adopted BCBS’s proposal to implement a countercyclical capital
bu er ranging from 0 to 2.5 percent of risk-weighted assets, as part of the new Basel
III framework.
At the same time, the global  nancial crisis has led to renewed calls for central banks
(and regulators) to consider more systematically potential trade-o s between the ob-
jectives of macroeconomic stability and  nancial stability, or equivalently whether the
central bank’s policy loss function (and therefore its interest rate response) should ac-
count explicitly for a  nancial stability goal. The issue is not new; it has long been
recognized, for instance, that an increase in interest rates aimed at preventing the de-
velopment of in ationary pressures may, at the same time, heighten uncertainty and
foster volatility in  nancial markets. The debate (which predates the recent crisis) has
focused on the extent to which monetary policy should respond to perceived misalign-
ments in asset prices, such as real estate and equity prices.3 In that context, several
observers have argued that trying to stabilize asset prices per se is problematic for a
number of reasons–one of which being that it is almost impossible to know for sure
whether a given change in asset values results from changes in underlying fundamen-
tals, nonfundamental factors, or both. By focusing on the implications of asset price
movements for credit growth and aggregate demand, the central bank may be able to
focus on the adverse e ects of these movements–without getting into the tricky issue
of deciding to what extent they represent changes in fundamentals.
This paper is an attempt to address both sets of issues in a uni ed framework. We
examine the role of both monetary policy and a capital regulation rule that bears close
similarity with some recent proposals to mitigate the procyclical tendencies of  nan-
cial systems, and evaluate their implications for macroeconomic stability and  nancial
stability. We do so under a Basel II-type regime, with endogenous risk weights on
bank assets. Among the issues that we attempt to address are the following: to pro-
mote  nancial stability, how should countercyclical bank capital requirement rules be
designed? Instead of adding a cyclical component to prudential regulation, shouldn’t
policymakers use monetary policy to constrain credit growth, as opposed to “leaning
against (price) bubbles” directly? To what extent should regulatory policy and mon-
etary policy be combined to ensure both macroeconomic and  nancial stability? Put
di erently, are these policies complementary or substitutes?
Quantitative studies of these issues are important for a number of reasons. Re-
garding the design of countercyclical bank capital rules, several observers have noted
that there are indeed signi cant potential practical problems associated with their
implementation–including the period over which relevant  nancial indicators (credit
growth rates, for that matter) should be calculated. More important perhaps is the
possibility that these rules may operate in counterintuitive ways, depending on the
degree of  nancial sector imperfections. In particular, in countries where bank credit
3See, for instance, Chadha et al. (2004), Filardo (2004), Akram et al. (2006), Faia and Monacelli
(2007), and Akram and Eitrheim (2008). Wadhwani (2008) provides a brief overview of the literature.
5plays a critical role in  nancing short-term economic activity (as is often the case in
developing economies), a rule that constrains the growth in overall credit could entail
a welfare cost. At the same time, of course, to the extent that it succeeds in reducing
 nancial volatility and the risk of a full-blown crisis, it may also enhance welfare. The
net bene ts of countercyclical bank capital rules may therefore be ambiguous in general
and numerical evaluations become essential.
Regarding the role of monetary policy, the key issue is whether a central bank
with a preference for output and price stability can improve its performance with
respect not only to these two objectives but also to  nancial stability, by responding to
excessive movements in credit and/or asset prices in addition to  uctuations in prices
and activity. In a relatively complex model, understanding the conditions that may
lead to trade-o s among objectives often requires quantitative experiments.
To conduct our analysis, we extend the New Keynesian model described in Agénor
et al. (2009). Important features of that model are that it accounts explicitly for a
variety of credit market imperfections and bank capital regulation.4 A housing sector is
introduced, and the role of real estate as collateral examined. Speci cally, we establish
a direct link between house prices and credit growth via their impact on collateral
values and interest rate spreads on loans: higher house prices enable producers to
borrow and invest more, by raising the value of the collateral that they can pledge
and improving the terms at which credit is extended. This mechanism is consistent
with the evidence suggesting that a large value of bank loans to (small)  rms, in both
industrial and developing countries, is often secured by real estate. To capture  nancial
instability, we focus initially on the behavior of real house prices.5 This is also in line
with the literature suggesting that  nancial crises are often preceded by unsustainable
developments in the real estate sector and private sector credit.
The paper continues as follows. Section II presents the model. We keep the presen-
tation very brief, given that many of its ingredients are described at length in Agénor
et al. (2009); instead, we focus on how the model presented here departs from that
paper, especially with respect to the  nancial sector and countercyclical policy rules.
The equilibrium is characterized in Section III. Key features of the steady state and
the log-linearized version, as well as a brief discussion of an illustrative calibration, are
discussed in Section IV. We present in Section V the impulse response functions associ-
ated with our base experiment: a temporary, positive housing demand shock. Section
VI discusses two alternative countercyclical rules, involving an augmented monetary
4There is a small but growing literature on the introduction of capital regulation in New Keynesian
models with banking; recent papers include Aguiar and Drumond (2007), Gerali et al. (2009), Dib
(2009, 2010), Hirakata et al. (2009), and Meh and Moran (2010). Some contributions have also
attempted to integrate countercyclical regulatory rules in this type of models; they include Covas and
Fujita (2010), Kannan et al. (2009), Levieuge (2009), Angelini et al. (2010), Angeloni and Faia (2010),
and Darracq Pariès et al. (2010). However, as is made clear later, our approach di ers signi cantly
from all of these contributions, making comparisons di cult.
5The concept of  nancial stability has remained surprisingly elusive in the existing literature; see
Goodhart (2006). Our focus in this paper is on an operational, quantitative measure of  nancial
instability.
6policy rule and a capital regulatory rule, both de ned in terms of deviations in credit
growth and aimed at promoting  nancial stability. Section VII investigates whether
the use of these rules (taken in isolation) generates gains in terms of both  nancial
and macroeconomic stability, that is, whether they entail a trade-o  among objectives;
to do so we present simulation results of the same housing demand shock under both
types of rules, for some speci c parameter values. Section VIII discusses optimal policy
rules, when the objective of the central bank is to minimize volatility in a measure of
“economic stability,” de ned as a weighted average of separate measures of macroeco-
nomic stability and  nancial stability. Section IX provides some sensitivity analysis.
The last section provides a summary of the main results and discusses the implications
of our analysis for the ongoing debate on reforming bank capital standards.
2 Outline of the Model
T h ec o r em o d e lp r e s e n t e di nt h i sp a p e rd e p a r t sf r o mA g é n o r ,A l p e r ,a n dP e r e i r ad a
Silva (2009) essentially by introducing a housing market and linking it with collateral
and loans for investment purposes. To save space, this section provides only a brief
outline of the model in most respects–except for bank regulation and the optimization
problem of the bank, for which a more formal analysis is presented.6
We consider a closed economy populated by six types of agents: in nitely-lived
households, intermediate good (IG) producers, a  nal good (FG) producer, a capital
good (CG) producer, a monopoly commercial bank, the government, and the central
bank, whose mandate also includes bank regulation. The  nal good is homogeneous
and can be used either for consumption or investment, although in the latter case
additional costs must be incurred.
There are two types of households, constrained and unconstrained.7 Constrained
households do not participate in asset markets and follow a rule-of-thumb which in-
volves consuming all their after-tax disposable wage income in each period. They also
supply labor inelastically. Unconstrained households consume, can trade in asset mar-
kets and hold  nancial assets (including nominal debt issued by the bank), and supply
labor to IG producers. As in Iacoviello (2005), Silos (2007), and Iacoviello and Neri
(2008), housing services are assumed to be proportional to their stock, which enters
directly in the utility function. These households also make their housing stock avail-
able, free of charge, to the CG producer, who uses it as collateral against which it
borrows from the bank to buy the  nal good and produce capital. At the beginning
of the period, unconstrained households choose the real levels of cash, deposits, bank
debt, government bonds, and labor supply to IG  rms. They receive all the pro ts
6A detailed, formal presentation of the model is available in the working paper version of this
article, which is available upon request.
7As discussed later, the distinction between these two types of households is useful to undersand
the dynamics of consumption following housing demand shocks. See Agénor and Montiel (2008) for a
discussion of why consumption smoothing may be imperfect in the context of developing countries.
7made by the IG producers, the CG producer, and the bank, and pay a lump-sum tax.
Optimization yields a standard Euler equation and a standard labor supply func-
tion, which relates hours worked positively to the real wage and negatively to consump-
tion. It also yields three asset demand equations: the  rst relates the real demand
for cash positively to consumption and negatively to the opportunity cost of holding
money, measured by the interest rate on government bonds; the second relates the real
demand for deposits positively to consumption and the deposit rate, and negatively to
t h eb o n dr a t e ;a n dt h et h i r di st h ed e m a n df o rb a n kd e b t , 













where    0 denotes an adjustment cost parameter,  the price of the  nal good, 

the bond rate, and 
 the rate of return on bank debt. Thus, the demand for bank debt
depends positively on its rate of return and negatively on the bond rate. Similarly,
there is a demand function for housing services, from which it can be established that
a positive shock to preferences for housing leads (all else equal) to a rise in today’s
demand for housing.
The FG producer’s optimization problem is speci ed in standard fashion. The  -
nal good, which is allocated to private consumption, government consumption, and
investment, is produced by assembling a continuum of imperfectly substitutable in-
termediate goods. The FG producer sells its output at a perfectly competitive price.
Given the intermediate-goods prices and the  nal-good price, it chooses the quantities
of intermediate goods that maximize its pro ts.
IG producers produce, using capital and labor, a distinct perishable good that is
sold on a monopolistically competitive market. At the beginning of the period, each
IG producer rents capital from the CG producer and borrows to pay wages in advance.
Loans contracted for the purpose of  nancing working capital (which are short-term in
nature) do not carry any risk, and are therefore made at a rate that re ects only the
marginal cost of borrowing from the central bank, 
 , which we refer to as the re nance
rate. These loans are repaid at the end of the period. IG producers solve a two-stage
problem. In the  rst stage, taking input prices as given, they rent labor and capital
in perfectly competitive factor markets so as to minimize real costs. This yields the
optimal capital-labor ratio. In the second stage, each IG producer chooses a sequence
of prices so as to maximize discounted real pro ts, subject to adjustment costs à la
Rotemberg (1982). The solution gives the adjustment process of the nominal price.
The CG producer owns all the capital in the economy and uses a linear technology
to produce capital goods. At the beginning of the period, it buys the  nal good from
t h eF Gp r o d u c e r .T h e s eg o o d sm u s tb ep a i di na d v a n c e ;t op u r c h a s e  n a lg o o d s ,t h e
C Gp r o d u c e rm u s tb o r r o wf r o mt h eb a n k .A tt h ee n do ft h ep e r i o d ,l o a n sa r ep a i di n
full with interest. Thus, the total cost of buying  nal goods for investment purposes
includes the lending rate, 
 . The CG producer combines investment goods and the
existing capital stock to produce new capital goods, subject to adjustment costs. The
8new capital stock is then rented to IG producers. The CG producer chooses the level of
the capital stock (taking the rental rate, the lending rate, and the price of the  nal good
as given) so as to maximize the value of the discounted stream of dividend payments
(nominal pro ts) to the household. The  rst-order condition for maximization shows
that the expected rental rate of capital is a function of the current and expected loan
rates, the latter through its e ect on adjustment costs in the next period.
The commercial bank (which is owned by unconstrained households) also supplies
credit to IG producers, who use it to  nance their short-term working capital needs.
Its supply of loans is perfectly elastic at the prevailing lending rate. To satisfy capital
regulations, it issues nominal debt at the beginning of time ,o n c et h el e v e lo f( r i s k y )
l o a n si sk n o w n . 8 It pays interest on household deposits (at rate 
 ), the liquidity that it
borrows from the central bank (at rate 
 ), and its debt. The maturity period of both
categories of bank loans and the maturity period of bank deposits by unconstrained
households is the same. In each period, loans are extended prior to activity (production
or investment) and paid o  at the end of the period. At the end of each period, the
bank is liquidated and a new bank opens at the beginning of the next; thus, all its
pro ts are distributed, bank debt is redeemed, and new debt is issued at the beginning
of the next period to comply with prudential regulatory rules.
Formally, and abstracting from required reserves and holdings of government bonds,
the bank’s balance sheet is

	
 = 	 +  + 

  (2)
where 	 is household deposits, 	
 total loans, 
 borrowing from the central bank













 and 	 are determined by private agents’ behavior, the balance sheet





  	  
 (4)
The bank is subject to risk-based capital requirements, imposed by the central
bank. It must hold an amount of capital that covers an endogenous percentage of its
risky loans.9 Loans for working capital needs bear no risk and are subject to a zero
8Thus, capital consists therefore, in the Basel terminology, solely of “supplementary” or “tier 2”
capital; there is no “core” or “tier 1” capital, that is, ordinary shares. In practice, to meet capital
requirements banks have often issued hybrid securities that are more like debt than equity. Data from
the International Monetary Fund show that at the end of 2008 the average ratio of equity made up
of issued ordinary shares to assets was only 2.5 percent for European banks and 3.7 percent for US
banks. However, under the new Basel III regime, the de nition of capital in terms of common equity
has been considerably tightened.
9Because the bank is liquidated at the end of each period, it does not accumulate capital through
retained earnings. This is in contrast to Angelini et al. (2010), for instance.
9weight in calculating capital requirements. Thus, with 	
 denoting the risk weight on








where   (01) is the “overall” capital ratio, de ned later, and 
	
 loans for in-
vestment. As in Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009), and in line with the “founda-
tion” variant of the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach of Basel II, we relate the
risk weight to the repayment probability of the CG producer estimated by the bank,
	








where   0 and ˜ 	 is the steady-state value of 	
 . In the steady state, the risk
weight is therefore normalized to unity.11
The bank is risk-neutral and chooses both the deposit and lending rates, and excess
capital, so as to maximize the present discounted value of its real pro ts.12 Because the
bank is liquidated and debt is redeemed at the end of each period, this optimization
program boils down to a period-by-period maximization problem, subject to several
constraints–the loan demand function from the CG producer, total credit, the balance
sheet constraint (4), the de nition of total capital (3), and the capital requirement
constraint (5). In addition, the bank internalizes the fact that the demand for loans by
the CG producer (supply of deposits by unconstrained households) depends negatively
(positively) on the lending (deposit) rate, and takes the repayment probability of the
CG producer, the value of collateral, capital requirements, prices and the re nance rate
as given.





















 ¯  +  (7)
10Under the IRB approach, the estimated credit risk–and the associated risk weights–are assumed
to be a function of four parameters: the probability of default (PD), the loss given default, the exposure
at default, and the loan’s maturity. Banks adopting the advanced variant of this approach must provide
all four of these parameters from their own internal ratings models; those adopting the foundation
variant provide only the PD parameter, with the other three parameters set extenally by regulators.
Appendix C in Agénor, Alper, and Pereira da Silva (2009) provides a justi cation for the reduced-
form, constant elasticity speci cation shown in (6), based on Basel II formulas. See also Angeloni and
Faia (2010), Covas and Fujita (2010), and Darracq Pariès et al. (2010).
11The Standardized Approach in Basel II can be modeled by making the risk weight a function of
the output gap, under the assumption that ratings are procyclical, in a manner similar to Zicchino
(2006) and Angeloni and Faia (2010), for instance. See Drumond (2009) and Panetta et al. (2009)
for a discussion of the evidence on this issue.
12To simplify matters, we solve only for the loan rate applicable to the CG producer. In principle,
even if loans to IG producers carry no risk and are extended at the marginal cost of funds (the re nance
rate), it should be assumed that the bank also determines it as part of its optimization problem–in
which case the elasticity of the demand for working capital loans would a ect the markup over the






















where   (01),   0, 
  (01),a n d ¯  the exogenous supply of housing.13 The
second term in this expression on the right-hand side, 	






expected repayment on loans to the CG producer if there is no default. The third
term represents what the bank expects to earn in case of default, that is, “e ective”
collateral, given by a fraction   (01) of “raw” collateral, that is, the housing stock.
Coe cient  can be viewed as a measure of e ciency of enforcement of debt contracts
(see Djankov et al. (2008)) or an inverse measure of anticreditor bias in the judicial
system (see Cavalcanti (2010)). Note also that collateral is “marked to market,” a
practice that has become prevalent in recent years and tends to magnify procyclicality
in leverage.
The fourth term, , represents the reserve requirements held at the central bank
and returned to the bank at the end of the period (prior to its closure). The term
(1+





 represents gross repayments to the central bank. The term (1+

 ) represents the value of bank debt redeemed at the end of the period plus interest.14
T h el a s tt e r m ,2( 

 ), captures the view that maintaining a positive capital
bu er generates some bene ts–it represents a signal that the bank’s  nancial position
is strong, and reduces the intensity of regulatory scrutiny (or degree of intrusiveness
in the bank’s operations), which in turn reduces the pecuniary cost associated with
providing the information required by the supervision authority; the restriction 
  1
ensures a sensible solution (see Agénor et al. (2009)).15










13Housing supply could be endogenized by adding a construction sector to the model. This would
reduce the volatility of housing prices, by allowing the housing stock to respond to demand shocks.
However, given the time frame of the model, the assumption of exogenous supply is quite reasonable.
14In the full version of the model presented in the working paper version of this article, we add
a linear term in , to capture the cost associated with issuing shares, which includes the cost of
underwriting, issuing brochures, etc. The cost of issuing equity could of course be de ned in a more
general way, to account for the fact that a) a positive capital bu er provides a signal to markets that
the bank is healthy, and b) in recessions (expansions), market funding is more di cult (easier) to
obtain.
15Angelini et al. (2010) assume that the cost of deviating from the required capital-assets ratio is
symmetric; they do not capture therefore the bene ts of capital bu ers. In Dib (2009, 2010), holding
bank capital in excess of the required level also generates gains. An alternative approach, which has
yet to be implemented (as far as we know) in New Keynesian models of the type discussed here, would
be to introduce a “precautionary” demand for excess capital along the lines proposed by Repullo and
Suarez (2009). In their framework, banks are unable to access equity markets in every period; by
holding capital bu ers today, they mitigate the possibility that their ability to lend in the future may
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where  is the interest elasticity of the supply of deposits to the deposit rate and 	
the interest elasticity of the CG demand for loans (or investment) to the lending rate.
Equation (8) shows that the equilibrium deposit rate is a markup over the re nance
rate. Equation (9) indicates that the gross lending rate depends negatively on the
repayment probability, and positively on a weighted average of the marginal cost of
borrowing from the central bank (at the gross rate 1+
 ) and the cost of issuing debt.
Weights on each component of funding costs are measured in terms of the ratio of
required capital to (risky) loans,  and 1  .
Equation (10) indicates that an increase in the cost of issuing debt, 
 , reduces
excess capital, whereas an increase in  raises excess capital. With  =0 , holding
capital beyond what is required brings no bene t, so  

 =0for all . Finally, an
increase in required capital, by raising the cost of issuing bank debt 
 , has an indirect,
negative e ect on the desired level of excess capital. There is therefore some degree of
substitutability between the two components of bank capital.
As in Agénor et al. (2009), the repayment probability 	
 is taken to depend pos-
itively on the e ective collateral-CG loan ratio (which mitigates moral hazard on the
part of borrowers), the cyclical position of the economy (as measured by the output
gap), and the bank’s capital-risky assets ratio, which increases incentives for the bank




















with   0  and 
 = ¯  is the output gap, with ¯  denoting the frictionless
level of aggregate output.16 Our speci cation is thus consistent with the “double moral
hazard” framework developed in Chen (2001), Aikman and Paustian (2006), and Meh
and Moran (2010), among others, according to which banks have greater incentives to
screen and monitor borrowers when more of their capital (relative to their outstanding
loans) is at stake.17 The novelty here is that we assume explicitly that greater monitor-
ing translates into a higher probability of repayment.18 Indeed, equations (9) and (11)
16This “semi reduced-form” approach to modeling the loan spread has been adopted in some other
contributions, such as Cúrdia and Woodford (2009).
17However, there are signi cant di erences in the way bank capital is modeled; here, bank capital is
motivated by regulatory requirements, rather than by a “pure” moral hazard problem. Also, in Meh
and Moran (2010) for instance, bank capital consists mostly of retained earnings.
18Allen et al. (2009) and Mehran and Thakor (2009) provide rigorous micro foundations for the link
between bank capital and monitoring. In Allen et al. (2009) a monopoly bank holds capital because
it strengthens its monitoring incentive and increases the borrower’s success probability, whereas in
Mehran and Thakor (2009) bank capital increases the future survival probability of the bank (as in
Repullo and Suarez (2009)), which in turn enhances the bank’s monitoring incentives. The reduced-
form approach that we use can be viewed as a convenient shortcut for macroeconomic analysis.
12imply a negative relationship between the capital-risky assets ratio and bank lending
spreads; direct support for this link is provided by Fonseca et al. (2010), in a study
of pricing behavior by more than 2,300 banks in 92 countries over the period 1990-
2007. Note also that if net worth values are procyclical, both the collateral and the
output gap e ects are consistent with the evidence suggesting that price-cost margins
in banking, or lending spreads, behave countercyclically (see for instance Aliaga-Díaz
and Olivero (2010)), and Fonseca et al. (2010, Tables 6 and 9)). Thus, in the model
the “bank capital channel” operates through two e ects on the lending rate: a cost
e ect (through 
 ) and an incentive monitoring e ect (through 	
 ).
The central bank’s assets consist of a  xed stock of government bonds, and loans
to the commercial bank, 
 , whereas its liabilities consists of currency supplied to
(unconstrained) households and  rms. Any income made by the central bank from
bond holdings and loans to the commercial bank is transferred to the government at
the end of each period. Monetary policy is operated by  xing the re nance rate, 
 ,
and providing uncollateralized loans (at the discretion of the commercial bank) through
a standing facility.19 In the baseline experiment, the re nance rate is determined by a









where ˜  is the steady-state value of the real interest rate on bonds,   0 the central
bank’s in ation target,   (01) a coe cient measuring the degree of interest rate
smoothing, and 1 2  0 the relative weights on in ation deviations from target and
the output gap, respectively, and  is a stochastic shock, which follows a  rst-order
autoregressive process.
Finally, the government purchases the  nal good and issues nominal riskless one-
period bonds. It collects tax revenues and all interest income that the central bank
makes from its lending to the commercial bank and its holdings of government bonds.
It adjusts lump-sum taxes to balance its budget.
Flows between agents (abstracting from the di erence between constrained and
unconstrained households) and the links between regulatory capital, the repayment
probability, and the lending rate, are summarized in Figures 1 and 2.
19Standing facilities are now commonly used in both high- and middle-income countries to create
(narrow) corridors to bound departures of short-term money market interest rates from target, with
open-market operations used for the secondary objective of smoothing liquidity and moderating inter-
est rate  uctuations. These facilities make the quantity of central bank cash endogenous, by providing
unlimited access–subject to collateral requirements and institutional rules on who is eligible to main-
tain current balances with the central bank–to extra cash at the posted interest rate. For simplicity,
we abstract from collateral requirements (typically low-risk and low-yield assets such as government
securities), open-market operations, and consider a zero-width band around the target rate.
133 Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium,  rms producing intermediate goods are identical. Equilib-
rium conditions must be satis ed for the credit, deposit, goods, labor, housing, bank
debt, and cash markets. Because the supply of loans by the commercial bank, and the
supply of deposits by households, are perfectly elastic at the prevailing interest rates,
the markets for loans and deposits always clear. Equilibrium in the goods markets
requires that production be equal to aggregate demand. The equilibrium condition of










4 Steady State and Calibration
The steady-state of the model is derived in Appendix A. With an in ation target 
equal to zero, the steady-state in ation rate ˜  is also zero. Beyond standard results
(on the steady-state value of the marginal cost, for instance), the key results on the
steady-state values of interest rates are as follows (with ˜ 	 =1 , by implication of (6)):
˜  
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From these equations it can be shown that˜    ˜  .W ea l s oh a v e ˜    ˜   for    0
because holding bank debt is subject to a cost; from the perspective of the household,
the rate of return on that debt must therefore compensate for that and exceed the rate
of return on government bonds. Of course, when   =0 ,t h e n˜   =˜  .F r o m t h e
above results, and because ˜    ˜  ,w ea l s oh a v e˜    ˜   for    0; bank capital is
more costly than deposits (or, equivalently, households demand a liquidity premium),
as in Aguiar and Drumond (2007). The reason here is that holding bank debt is costly.
To analyze the response of the economy to shocks, we log-linearize the model around
a nonstochastic, zero-in ation steady state. The log-linearized equations are summa-
rized in Appendix B. A key property of the model is that deviations of real investment
from its steady-state level depend on deviations in the lending rate, which depend
themselves on deviations in the capital-risky assets ratio. Thus, regulatory policy, just
like monetary policy, has a direct e ect on aggregate demand.
The calibration of the model, which we view as illustrative, is described in detail
in Appendix C. Table 1 summarizes parameter values.20 A few parameters are worth
20A more complete table is provided in the working paper version of this article.
14noting here; in particular, the adjustment cost parameter for holdings of bank debt,
 ,i ss e ta t0
3. The adjustment cost for transforming the  nal good into investment,
 , is set at 14. The elasticities of the repayment probability with respect to the
collateral-risky loans ratio, the bank capital-risky assets ratio, and cyclical output are
set at 1 =0 
03, 2 =0 
0,a n d3 =0 
15, respectively.21 Thus, in the benchmark cali-
bration, we abstract from the “monitoring incentive e ect” of the bank capital channel
identi ed earlier. The elasticities of the risk weight with respect to the repayment
probability, , as well as the cost parameter  a r es e ta tl o wv a l u e s ,0
05 and 0
004,
respectively. Because  is a parameter that could potentially in uence in important
ways the transmission e ects of capital requirements (and thus the performance of the
countercyclical regulatory rule), we will later consider alternative values. Our speci -
cation of the risk weight (6) implies that its value is unity in the steady state; we set
the overall capital adequacy ratio  to 0
08. We also calibrate the excess capital-risky
assets ratio to be equal to 0
04. This implies that the steady-state ratio of total bank
capital to risky loans is set at about 12 percent (so that ˜  
˜   =0 
53), in line with
the evidence reported in Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009). For the monetary policy
rule, we set 1 =1 
2, 2 =0 
2,a n d =0 
0 initially. Our calibration also implies a
total (corporate) credit-to-output ratio of about 60 percent, which is consistent with
data for several middle-income countries where  nancial intermediation is bank-based
and consumer lending remains limited. The proportion of constrained households is set
to 0
3; this is close to the average estimate of Coenen and Straub (2005), who found
that the proportion of constrained households in the Euro area varies between 0
25 and
0
37.22 For the degree of persistence of the housing demand shock, we assume a value
of 0
6.
5 Housing Demand Shock
To illustrate the functioning of the model when concerns with  nancial stability are
absent, we consider as a base experiment a positive temporary shock to housing pref-
erences that translates into an impact increase in real house prices of 1.6 percentage
points. The results are summarized in Figure 3.23
21Higher values of 1 destabilize the model very quickly. While this may not be inconsistent with
recent facts, in the model this is also related to the fact that only housing is used as collateral.
If physical capital could also be used for that purpose, it would be possible to increase 1 quite
substantially, as can be inferred from the results in Agénor and Alper (2009).
22This value is substantially lower than some of the results reported in Agénor and Montiel (2008).
However, much of the early literature relates to developing countries in general (including therefore
low-income countries) and does not account for the  nancial liberalization that has occurred in many
middle-income countries over the past two decades.
23Our goal is to illustrate the dynamics induced by a “fundamental” shock to asset prices, rather
than unsustainable changes in expectations. Although the size and the persistence of the e ect of
our shock on house prices is not comparable to the much more persistent movements in these prices
observed during typical booms, the qualitative e ects are quite similar to those of a “standard” house
price bubble. A more formal attempt to model asset price bubbles, involving more persistent shocks,
15The immediate e ect of the shock is to raise housing prices. In turn, this raises
the value of collateral and thus the repayment probability. The lending rate therefore
drops, thereby stimulating investment in the  rst period. The increase in aggregate
demand is matched by an increase in supply (given sticky prices) and this stimulates
the demand for labor. Over time, the increase in investment raises the capital stock;
this raises the marginal product of labor and therefore gross wages. At the same time,
the increase in the capital stock tends to lower the rental rate of capital.
The increase in output tends to raise immediately the policy rate; combined with the
increase in the gross wage, this tends to raise the e ective cost of labor for the producers
of intermediate goods.24 Because the rental rate of capital does not change on impact
(due to the one-period lag in capital accumulation), marginal costs unambiguously
increase in the  rst period. In ation therefore rises, putting further upward pressure
on the policy rate. Over time, the reduction in the rental rate of capital induced by
the boom in investment tends to lower marginal costs and in ation.
The higher policy rate (which translates into a higher deposit rate) is also accompa-
nied by a higher interest rate on government bonds. The reason is that the increase in
the deposit rate raises demand for these assets; this translates into a reduction in bank
borrowing from the central bank. The reduction in money supply must be matched by
a lower demand for currency, which is brought about by a higher bond rate. This leads
to a shift in consumption from the present to the future for unconstrained consumers,
who do not bene t directly from the collateral e ect induced by higher house prices
because they do not borrow from the banking system; moreover, the intertemporal
e ect in consumption dominates any wealth e ect associated with a positive (but tem-
porary) housing price shock. This downward e ect dominates the positive response of
spending by constrained consumers (given the increase in their labor income), so that
aggregate consumption falls.25 This mitigates the increase in aggregate demand in-
duced by the initial investment boom. The drop in consumption reduces the marginal
utility of leisure and induces unconstrained households to supply more labor, thereby
mitigating the upward pressure on real wages.
The increase in the repayment probability lowers the risk weight under the Basel
II-type regulatory capital regime that we consider, which tends to reduce capital re-
quirements. However, the increase in risky assets (loans to the CG producer) dom-
inates, which implies that required capital increases; in turn, this tends to raise the
rate of return on bank debt. Given that the policy rate increases, the net e ect on the
demand for excess bank capital is ambiguous in general; given our calibration, it actu-
could follow along the lines of Bernanke and Gertler (1999), as done in Levieuge (2009).
24Recall that the e ective cost of labor for IG producers is the gross re nance rate 1+ times the
gross wage.
25The fall in consumption, which lowers the demand for currency, attenuates the initial increase
in the bond rate. A positive response of aggregate consumption could be obtained by increasing
signi cantly the share of unconstrained households, compared to the base calibration. However, a
consumption boom is not a stylized fact associated with periods of sustained increases in house prices;
see Detken and Smets (2004) International Monetary Fund (2009).
16ally increases. The increase in the cost of issuing bank debt mitigates the downward
impact on the lending rate associated with the collateral e ect.
In sum, the results of this experiment suggest that the model is consistent with
the view that a demand-induced boom in housing prices may lead, through a  nancial
accelerator mechanism that operates through collateral values and borrowing costs,
to rapid increases in investment, an expansion in output, in ationary pressures, and
debt accumulation. Conversely, a bust in housing prices, through the same asset price
channel, can lead to a credit crunch, a contraction in output and investment, and
de ation. Because our analysis focused on a temporary shock, the simulation results
do not identify explicitly any tendency for instability; however, it is clear from our
description of the transmission mechanism that a shock of su cient duration could
well induce unsustainable movements in real and  nancial variables, and thus economic
instability, in the absence of a timely policy response. We now turn to an examination
of the policies that could help to mitigate  nancial instability, and the extent to which
doing so may entail trade-o s with respect to macroeconomic stability.
6 Policy Rules for Economic Stability
We now consider two alternative approaches to mitigating  nancial instability, in line
with some recent proposals. The  rst involves adjusting the re nance rate in response
to a  nancial stability indicator, whereas the second focuses on reducing the degree of
procyclicality of the  nancial system through discretionary regulation of bank capital,
in line with the new Basel III regime.
6.1 An Augmented Interest Rate Rule
In the  rst approach that we consider, the central bank adjusts its policy rate directly
in response to changes in an indicator of  nancial stability. Speci cally, we replace the















 is the growth rate of nominal credit to the CG producer, and  ln˜ 	
is the steady-state value of that variable. Thus, in line with the discussion in the
introduction, the central bank sets its re nance rate in part to “lean against the wind.”
Following a positive shock to housing prices for instance, and an increase in collateral
values, the lending rate drops and stimulates investment; an increase in the re nance
rate tends to mitigate the drop in the cost of bank borrowing and therefore to dampen
the investment boom. We can analyze the performance of alternative interest rate rules
(that is, di erent values of 3  0) in terms of speci c indicators of macroeconomic
stability and  nancial stability, and compare them to the base case where 3 =0 .
176.2 A Countercyclical Regulatory Capital Rule
The second rule can be introduced by decomposing the overall capital ratio, ,i n t oa







Thus, the component  can be viewed as the minimum capital adequacy ratio
imposed under Pillar 1 of the Basel regime, whereas the component 
 can be viewed
as the “discretionary” adjustment that now forms part of the Basel III regime.26 The
experiment presented in the previous section assumed that 
 =0and  =  .
Adjustment of the cyclical component follows a simple dynamic rule; we relate













  and "
  0 the adjustment parameter.27 Thus, the macropru-
dential rule is designed so as to directly counter the easing of lending conditions that
induces borrowers to take on more debt as house prices increase.
Suppose that in period  there is an increase in housing prices, due to a demand
shock. As discussed earlier, the rise in the value of collateral tends to raise the repay-
ment probability immediately, which reduces the lending rate and stimulates borrowing
for investment by the CG producer. The increase in house prices is therefore procycli-
cal. A rule like (16), by imposing higher capital requirements, tends to raise directly
the cost of issuing debt by the bank, thereby mitigating the initial expansionary e ect
associated with higher collateral values. Thus, it dampens procyclicality of the  nancial
system. It is consistent with the spirit, if not the letter, of some of the recent proposals
to amend or reform Basel II capital standards, such as Goodhart and Persaud (2008),
as mentioned in the introduction, and the recently-adopted rule under Basel III.28
Nevertheless, in the general equilibrium framework, whether the e ect on the lend-
ing rate is positive or negative depends also on the net e ect on the repayment prob-
ability, which depends (as noted earlier) not only on the collateral-CG loan ratio, but
also on the cyclical position of the economy and the bank capital-risky assets ratio.
In particular, under the risk-sensitive regulatory regime that we consider, the increase
in the repayment probability induced by the improvement in the collateral-risky loans
ratio lowers the risk weight and tends to reduce capital requirements. If the counter-
cyclical regulatory rule is not too aggressive (in the sense that "
 is not too high),
26In the ongoing debate about the implementation of Basel III, there is still discussion as to whether
the countercyclical component should be made mandatory or left to the discretion of local regulators.
See the  nal section for some further comments.
27Although the rule for 
 is not a backward-looking rule, we assume that the bank takes  as
given when solving its optimization problem. Thus, the bank pricing rules derived earlier remain
unchanged.
28The second dimension of the rule proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2009), related to the mismatch
in the maturity of assets and liabilities, cannot be implemented in our setup.
18the capital-risky assets ratio will fall, and this will tend to mitigate the initial rise in
the repayment probability and the drop in the loan rate. If so, then, the monitoring
incentive e ect will operate in the same direction as the cost e ect. By contrast, if the
regulatory rule is very aggressive (high "
), total capital may increase by more than
t h ei n c r e a s ei nr i s k yl o a n s ,a n dt h i sm a yl e a dt oahigher repayment probability and a
lower lending rate, making the regulatory rule (16) more, rather than less, procyclical.
Thus the con icting e ects of the two dimensions of the bank capital channel may make
the policy counterproductive. Alternatively, if the bene t from holding capital bu ers
(as measured by ) is not too large, the regulatory capital rule may be even more
e ective. To assess the most likely outcomes requires numerical simulations, based on
some optimality criteria.
6.3 Stability Measures and Policy Loss Function
We assume in what follows that the central bank is concerned with two objectives,
macroeconomic stability and  nancial stability. Both concepts, as noted earlier, can
be de ned in di erent ways; in this paper, we de ne macroeconomic stability in terms
of the coe cient of variation of nominal income (thereby imposing implicitly equal
weights on output and price volatility) and  nancial stability in terms of the coe cient
of variation of real housing prices.29 In addition, we also de ne a composite index
of economic stability, de ned with two sets of weights:  rst with equal weight 0.5 to
each objective of stability, and second with a weight of 0.8 for macroeconomic stability
and 0.2 for  nancial stability. Let  ($) denote the volatility of $; formally, this is
equivalent to de ning the central bank’s instantaneous policy loss function   as









7 Model Dynamics and Policy Trade-o s
Before we study optimal policies, we begin with a simple examination of how the two
rules (14) and (16) operate, independently of each other. Figure 4 shows how the
two rules a ect our separate measures of (in)stability when the underlying shock is
the same as described earlier–a positive shock to housing preferences. The  gure
suggests that there is no trade-o  among policy objectives: a more aggressive response
to credit growth gaps leads, in either case, to a monotonic reduction in both indicators
29In turn, coe cients of variations are based on the asymptotic (unconditional) variances of the
relevant variable.
30A quadratic term in the change in the policy rate,  (
  
1), to capture the cost attached to
nominal interest rate  uctuations. Because this would lead to more persistence, we account for that
cost directly by considering di erent values of  in our experiments.
19of volatility.31 Thus, from the perspective of either policy objective, monetary and
countercyclical regulatory policies appear to be substitutes, rather than complements.32
However, the curves have a convex shape, which indicates that the marginal bene t
of either policy diminishes as it becomes more aggressive. Indeed, the upper panels
suggest that beyond a value of 3 =0 
6, the gain in terms of reduced volatility become
smaller; a similar result holds in the lower panels for "
 above 4.33
The next step is to examine to what extent their combination leads to lower vari-
ability in either target. Figure 5 shows 3D diagrams of macroeconomic and  nancial
stability indicators (measured as described earlier), as well as in ation in the price of
the  nal good and the output gap, and changes in policy and lending rates, for 3
varying between 0 and 2
5 (Northwest horizontal axis) and for "
 varying between 0
and 10 (Northeast horizontal axis). The outer contour of each graph corresponds to the
convex curves shown in Figure 4. The  gures suggest clearly that, given our base cal-
ibration, the marginal contribution of the regulatory capital rule, once an augmented
interest rate is in place, decreases rapidly, in terms of either macroeconomic stability
and  nancial stability.
The results with respect to our index of economic stability are shown in Figure 6,
again for 3 varying between 0 and 2
5 and for "
 varying between 0 and 10.T h e
conclusion that can be inferred from the graph is the same as before: given our base
calibration, the marginal contribution of the regulatory capital rule to economic sta-
bility decreases rapidly once the augmented interest rate rule is used. Put di erently,
countercyclical bank regulation may not provide very large bene ts, if monetary policy
can be made more reactive to an indicator of  nancial stability. However, to the extent
that monetary policy is constrained (because the central bank fears destabilizing mar-
kets by raising interest rates too sharply while in ation remains subdued, for instance),
there may be some degree of complementarity between the two rules: a countercyclical
regulatory rule can help to improve outcomes with respect to both objectives. Put
di erently, the convexity of the curves shown in Figures 4 and 6 suggests that, if there
is a cost in implementing large changes in the policy rate, it may be optimal to combine
the two policies.
31Although not reported, the volatility of the re nance rate falls as well, as either policy rule
becomes more aggressive. This is because a model with forward-looking private agents, such as this
one, has strong expectational e ects–households anticipate a stronger reaction from the central bank
and factor it into their decision-making process. The result is that monetary policy works partly
through the threat of a stronger response, instead of actually delivering that stronger response.
32Note that the absence of trade-o s relates only to policy responses with respect to housing demand
shocks and depends on the fact that we abstract from output-in ation trade-o s, by focusing on the
volatility of nominal income.
33The working paper version of this illustrates the dynamics of a housing demand shock for these
two values of 3 and 
.
208O p t i m a l P o l i c i e s
We now consider how the parameters 3 and "
 in the two rules (14) and (16) can be
determined optimally, so as to minimize economic instability (17). As can be inferred
from Figures 4 and 5, the fact that there is no tradeo  among policy objectives, and
that the augmented interest rate rule is more powerful in mitigating volatility, means
that, in general if there is no restriction on the value of 3 the optimal policy always
implies setting "
 =0 . To generate a role for regulatory policy, suppose that the
central bank chooses not to react beyond a certain point to changes in credit growth,
out of concern that large changes in interest rates can generate instability. To account
for this, we perform a set of experiments in which we arbitrarily limit the value of 3 to
a “plausible” upper limit, which we set at 2
5. At the same time, we impose a higher
limit on the parameter "
,e q u a lt o10. Thus, our analysis is best described as a search
for “constrained” optimal policies, with a relatively less aggressive potential response
of monetary policy to credit growth gaps.
Table 2 reports the results. We calculate optimal values based on di erent sets
of two other key parameters: the response of the policy rate to deviations of in ation
from target, 1, and the degree of persistence in the policy rate, . In addition to the
baseline value 1 =1 
2, we consider two other values, 1
5 and 1
8, which capture a
more aggressive stance toward in ation. For the smoothing parameter we consider, in
addition to the baseline value  =0 
0,v a l u e so f =0 
4 and  =0 
8; again, these
alternative values capture the view that underlying preferences re ect a concern with
movements in policy rates that are too large, possibly because the central bank believes
that large movements can destabilize  nancial markets.34 We calculate the value of
the loss function (17) for all values of 3 varying between 0 and 2
5,a n d"
 varying
between 0 and 10. We perform a grid search at intervals of 0
0125 for 3 and 0
5 for
"
, which is quite large but su cient to illustrate our main points.
The results can be summarized as follows. First, if monetary policy can react
strongly to in ation deviations from its target value, the best policy is to follow an
aggressive augmented interest rate rule–regardless of the degree of persistence in the
policy rate. By contrast, if monetary policy cannot react su ciently strongly to in a-
tion deviations from targets (because the central bank fears destabilizing markets by
raising interest rates too sharply), combining a credit-augmented interest rate rule and
a countercyclical capital regulatory rule is optimal for promoting economic stability.
Second, the greater the degree of interest rate smoothing, the stronger should be the
countercyclical regulatory response–regardless of how strongly monetary policy can
react to in ation. In fact, with a multi-period loss function (as opposed to the instan-
taneous speci cation in (17)), and depending on the discount rate, the fact that the
volatility of the change in the lending rate increases at  rst with increases in 3 (as
shown in Figure 5) could militate even more strongly in favor of the regulatory rule.
34Alternatively, high persistence in the policy rate is viewed as desirable because, as argued by
Woodford (1999), it allows the government to commit to future in ation targets.
21Third, the stronger the policymaker’s concern with macroeconomic stability (compared
to  nancial stability), the stronger should be the sensitivity of countercyclical regula-
tion to real credit growth gaps.
The  rst two results suggest that monetary and regulatory policies are comple-
mentary rather than substitutes; even with aggressive responses to in ation and credit
growth gaps, it is optimal to rely also on the countercyclical regulatory rule as the
degree of interest rate smoothing increases. The third result is somewhat counterintu-
itive; one would have expected that the stronger the concern with  nancial instability,
the stronger reliance should be on countercyclical capital regulation. The reason is
that, in our base calibration, the countercyclical regulatory rule has quite a powerful
e ect on stabilizing aggregate demand (through capital formation) and output; this
is because we assumed that all purchases of goods for investment purposes must be
 nanced in advance, through bank loans. In turn, movements in output tend to domi-
nate changes in in ation and therefore account for most of the changes in the index of
macroeconomic instability.
9 Sensitivity Analysis
To assess the sensitivity of the previous results, we consider several additional experi-
ments: a higher elasticity of the repayment probability to the capital-risky assets ratio,
an alternative measure of  nancial instability (the credit-to-GDP ratio), the intro-
duction of the real (rather than nominal) credit growth gap in the interest rate rule,
and an alternative loss function–more in line with an in ation targeting regime–that
attaches more weight to in ation in the index of macroeconomic stability.
9.1 Response to Capital-Risky Assets Ratio
For the  rst experiment, we account for a monitoring incentive e ect of the bank capital
channel (as described earlier) by increasing the elasticity 2 from its initial value of
zero to 0
05. This alternative value is within the two-standard error con dence interval
for the elasticity of the bank loan spread with respect to the capital-risky assets ratio
estimated by Fonseca et al. (2009) for developing countries.
The results are summarized in Table 3. They indicate that a stronger bank capital
channel (operating through a monitoring incentive e ect) strengthens the countercycli-
cal regulatory rule in the presence of risk-sensitive weights. The reason is that following
the housing price shock and the initial increase in the repayment probability (as dis-
cussed earlier), the weight on risky assets in our Basel II-type regime tends to fall;
this lowers capital requirements and therefore tends to reduce the capital-risky assets
ratio. In turn, this mitigates the bank’s incentives to monitor and reduces the repay-
ment probability–thereby o setting the initial increase in that variable and dampening
the initial drop in the lending rate. Thus, a stronger bank capital channel (operating
through monitoring and screening incentives) makes the countercyclical regulatory rule
22more e ective.
9.2 Alternative Measure of Financial Instability
In the third experiment, we consider an alternative to real house prices as a measure
of  nancial instability, namely, the credit-to-GDP ratio. Empirical studies of banking
crises in developing countries have documented that large increases in that ratio often
precede the occurrence of these crises (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) and
Agénor and Montiel (2008)).35 The results (which are not shown here to save space)
remain qualitatively very similar to those reported in Table 2.
9.3 Real or Nominal Credit Growth?
As an alternative to nominal credit growth, we tried to insert the growth rate of
real credit in the interest rate rule. Nominal credit growth includes an in ationary
component; thus, the bene ts of responding to that variable via an interest rate rule
might result from that component. By using real credit growth, our goal is to see
whether responding to another real variable (in addition to the output gap) changes
our base results.
Our simulations (which are again not reported to save space) show that this change
in the interest rate rule improves with respect to both stability objectives; both macro-
economic and in ation volatility are reduced compared to the base case with nominal
credit growth. But this modi cation does not alter the main conclusions initially
presented regarding the optimality of the augmented interest rate and the regulatory
rules.
9.4 Alternative Loss Function
In the foregoing discussion, the indicator of macroeconomic stability that we used
was based on the volatility of nominal income, as shown in (17). However, the focus
on nominal income is not necessarily consistent with in ation targeting, which is the
underlying regime upon which the policy reaction function (12) is based.
Accordingly, we replace the policy loss function (17) by a function that explicitly
distinguishes between the volatility of in ation deviations from target (which is zero
here) and the volatility of the output gap:









  0 and as before %
	  (01). A “standard” in ation targeting regime
corresponds therefore to %
	 =0 .
35Another proxy for  nancial (in)stability, as proposed by Granville and Mallick (2009), is the
volatility of the deposit-loan ratio. For more micro-based approaches to measuring  nancial instability,
see De Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008), Blavy and Souto (2009), and Segoviano and Goodhart (2009).
23Table 5 reports the results with values of %
 equal to 0
2 and 0
5, which captures
the idea that the central bank is more concerned with  uctuations in in ation as
opposed to output volatility and for %
	 =0 
2, which corresponds to the case where
the central bank is only mildly concerned with  nancial stability. Comparing Tables
2 and 5 suggests again a somewhat counterintuitive result: even though the concern
with  nancial instability is not as strong as in the base case, and the central bank
is now more concerned with in ation volatility than  uctuations in the output gap,
the optimal policy is still to rely on countercyclical capital regulation if manipulating
t h ep o l i c yr a t ei sc o n s t r a i n e d – t h em o r es oi ft h ed e g r e eo fp e r s i s t e n c ei nt h ep o l i c y
rate is high. The reason again is that raising the capital bu er in response to the
growth in investment loans has a sizable impact on aggregate demand–and thus on
macroeconomic stability.
10 Summary and Policy Implications
The purpose of this paper has been to examine the roles of monetary policy and bank
capital regulatory policy in mitigating procyclicality and promoting macroeconomic
and  nancial stability. The analysis was based on a dynamic, structural optimizing
macroeconomic model with imperfect credit markets and Basel-type bank capital regu-
lation, with both cost and monitoring incentive e ects. The model incorporates also an
asset price- nancial accelerator mechanism, by which induced changes in asset prices
a ect the value of the collateral pledged by borrowers and hence the cost of loans.
Macroeconomic stability is initially de ned in terms of the volatility of nominal in-
come, whereas  nancial stability is de ned initially in terms of the variability of real
house prices. Our basic experiment showed that a positive housing demand shock,
through its e ect on collateral values, leads to a credit expansion and an investment
boom. This is consistent with the evidence and provides the proper “background” for
discussing the roles of monetary and regulatory policies in achieving economic stability.
We next considered two policy rules aimed at mitigating  nancial instability: a
credit-augmented interest rate rule and a Basel III-type countercyclical regulatory cap-
ital rule, both based on a “credit growth gap” measure. The premise for the  rst rule
is that a central bank’s response to credit growth may serve to stabilize market condi-
tions (namely, the lending rate), by o setting the expansionary (balance sheet) e ect
induced by a positive shock to asset prices. The second rule is motivated by the view
that capital regulation should be operated in a more  exible manner to account for
changes in systemic risk over the business cycle. In both cases, the underlying view is
that the expansion of credit is an essential ingredient in the build-up of imbalances in
the  nancial system.
Numerical experiments showed,  rst, that there are no trade-o s between macro-
economic and  nancial stability objectives when each instrument is used in isolation.
Second, if monetary policy cannot react su ciently strongly to in ation deviations
from targets–due to concerns about interest rate volatility feeding uncertainty about
24economic fundamentals, or because of fears that sharp changes in interest rates while
in ation is low could induce volatility in price expectations and destabilize markets,
for instance–combining a credit-augmented interest rate rule and a countercyclical
capital regulatory rule is optimal for mitigating economic instability. This result also
holds if monetary policy can respond aggressively to in ation, as long as the degree of
interest rate smoothing is high. Third, the greater the concern with macroeconomic
stability (compared to  nancial instability) is, the larger the role of countercyclical
regulation. Although somewhat counterintuitive, this last result re ects the fact that
in our framework capital regulation is a very e ective tool for constraining the growth
in aggregate demand, because all investment is  nanced through bank loans. Vari-
ous sensitivity tests help to qualify somewhat theses results but do not alter them in
fundamental ways.
Our results are useful in the context of the current debate on the role of monetary
policy in fostering  nancial stability and on reforming bank capital standards. First,
some observers have argued that, to the extent that credit growth a ects output (as
i st h ec a s ei no u rm o d e l ) ,t h e r em a yb en or e a s o nf o rm o n e t a r yp o l i c yt or e a c ta b o v e
and beyond what is required to stabilize output and in ation. Our results suggest
that this precept is not generally true. Second, as noted in the introduction, the in
November 2010 the G20, under proposition by the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision, adopted a countercyclical capital bu er rule based on a credit-to-GDP gap
measure. The fundamental idea underlying countercyclical regulation is that  nancial
markets, left to themselves, are inherently procyclical. But even though (excessive)
risk becomes apparent in bad times, it is mainly generated in boom times. Thus, the
time for regulators to intervene is precisely during good times, to prevent excessive
risk taking and moderate the growth in bank credit. By operating in a countercycli-
cal fashion,  nancial regulation therefore helps ensure that banks build up resources
in good times, to help cushion adverse shocks in bad times. At the same time, it is
important to implement countercyclical regulation through relatively simple rules that
cannot be easily changed by regulators so they will not become “captured” by the gen-
eral “exuberance” that characterizes booms nor by vested interests (see Brunnermeier
et al. (2009)). Our analysis suggests, however, that the bene ts of these rules may
also be less than believed if monetary policy can endogenously respond to (excessive)
credit growth. It also casts doubt on the wisdom of making a countercyclical capital
requirement component mandatory under Pillar 1 of the new Basel III regime; large
structural di erences across countries may make the attempt to impose a uniform rule
problematic.
The analysis can be extended in several directions. First, as noted earlier, although
 nancial instability is commonly associated with periods of booms and busts in asset
prices and credit, there is no widely accepted de nition and (hence) indicator of  nan-
cial stability; in our analysis we focused initially on a single indicator, real house prices,
and then considered the credit-to-GDP ratio. However, alternative indicators are pos-
25sible, as suggested by the empirical evidence.36 More generally, it could be argued
that  nancial instability is associated with  uctuations in several  nancial and real
economic variables rather than in just asset prices. Financial stability may therefore
be di cult to assess by merely focusing on a single or a limited set of either  nancial or
real economic variables. A useful extension would be consequently to consider broad
(or composite) indicators and examine how our results are altered. In particular, one
could combine real house prices with a credit growth gap measure and bank lending
rates, to derive a composite indicator of  nancial instability, with weights on each
individual variable based on the literature that measures the relative importance of
each in predicting either banking crises (see Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2005),
and Agénor and Montiel (2008)) or periods of  nancial stress (see Misina and Tkacz
(2009)).
Second, in the de nition of our countercyclical regulatory capital rule, we included
only loans to capital goods producers, on the ground that loans for working capi-
tal needs are not risky. In practice, however, a legitimate question is whether such a
distinction between components of credit can be meaningfully implemented, given well-
known fungibility problem and the risk that di erences in regulation may encourage
banks to engage in distortive practices (see Hilbers et al. (2005)). This is a particu-
larly important consideration for middle-income countries, where the institutional and
regulatory environment is often weak to begin with. If so, then, there may be little
choice but to apply the regulatory rule on total credit–with possible adverse welfare
e ects, in countries where working capital needs represent a large share of bank loans.
Third, a more formal analysis of optimal rules, based on conditional discounted
utility of the di erent categories of agents, would allow a more comprehensive study of
the welfare e ects of a credit-responsive monetary policy and countercyclical regulatory
capital rules, in the presence of both macroeconomic and  nancial stability objectives.37
Finally, we must point out that our assessment of the bene ts of countercyclical
regulatory rules did not address implementation issues. In general, the implementation
of macroprudential regulation requires stronger coordination (in countries where they
are independent to begin with) between central banks and supervisory authorities.
The issue of how best to achieve such coordination in practice remains a matter of
debate. Another practical issue to consider is the extent to which the introduction of
macroprudential rules may adversely a ect the anti-in ation credibility of the central
bank–a particularly important concern in countries where such credibility remains
precarious. The risk is that the announcement of greater reliance on macroprudential
regulation give rise to expectations that the central bank may now pursue a more
36See Segoviano and Goodhart (2009). In De Graeve et al. (2008) for instance,  nancial stability
is de ned and measured as a bank’s probability of distress according to the supervisor’s de nition of
problem banks used for supervisory policy.
37Faia and Monacalli (2007) for instance found that monetary policy should respond to increases
in asset prices by lowering interest rates. In addition, when monetary policy responds strongly to
in ation, the marginal welfare gain of responding to asset prices vanishes. However, Angeloni and
Faia (2010) found opposite results.
26accommodative monetary policy in the face of in ationary pressures, thereby weakening
its credibility. A transparent communications strategy that clari es the nature of
macroprudential rules and the way they are expected to operate, while emphasizing
the fundamental complementarity between the “traditional” objectives of monetary
policy and the goal of  nancial stability, may thus be essential.
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6 Elasticity of intertemporal substitution
 1
5 Relative preference for leisure
 0
02 Relative preference for money holdings
 0
02 Relative preference for housing
' 0
82 Share parameter in index of money holdings
  0
3 Adjustment cost parameter, holdings of bank debt
 0
3 Share of constrained households
Production
" 10
0 Elasticity of demand, intermediate goods
( 0
65 Share of labor in output, intermediate good
	 74
5 Adjustment cost parameter, prices
) 0
01 Depreciation rate of capital
  14 Adjustment cost parameter, investment
Bank
 0
06 E ective collateral-loan ratio
 0
0 Weight of capital stock in total collateral
1 0
03 Elasticity of repayment prob wrt collateral
2 0
0 Elasticity of repayment prob wrt capital-risky assets ratio
3 1
5 Elasticity of repayment prob wrt cyclical output
 0
05 Elasticity of the risk weight wrt prob of repayment
 0
05 Cost of adjustment, bond holdings
 0
08 Cost of issuing bank capital
 0
004 Bene t of holding excess bank capital
 0
08 Capital adequacy ratio (deterministic component)
Central bank
 0
1 Reserve requirement rate
 0
0 Degree of interest rate smoothing by central bank
1 1
5 Response of re nance rate to in ation deviations
2 0
15 Response of re nance rate to output gap
Shocks
 0
6 Degree of persistence, monetary policy shock
  0
60
002 Persistence/standard dev, housing demand shock
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